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The Role of Deposit Insurance in the
Emerging Financial Services Industry*
William M. Isaact
Revolutionary changes are now taking place in the financial system. A
structure put into place a half century ago, at the bottom of the Great
Depression, is crumbling, and a new structure is rapidly taking shape. In
part, these changes itre deliberate but, in larger part, they result from the
forces of economics and technology. The central question facing the fed-
eral government today is not whether change will or should continue but,
rather, how to assure that the resulting financial structure will be one that
best serves the public interest.
Deposit insurance has been an integral part of the financial system for
a half century.1 It is responsible, in considerable part, for the structure of
depository institutions that has evolved and the nature of the supervision
and regulation of depository institutions. It is, therefore, impossible to
consider any government response to the changing structure of the
financial services industry without addressing the role of the insuring
agencies.3 Congress recognized this in the Garn-St. Germain Depository
* This Article is based on the in-depth comments and recommendations submitted to Congress by
the FDIC pursuant to section 712 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1544.
t Mr. Isaac is Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In April 1978, he ac-
cepted, with the consent of the Senate, a six-year presidential appointment to the Board of Directors
of the FDIC; he was elected Chairman of the Board in August 1981. Mr. Isaac is also the Chairman
of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (see Title X of the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, 3694) and a
member of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (see Title II of the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 142) and
of Vice President Bush's Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services. Before joining the FDIC,
Mr. Isaac was general counsel and corporate secretary for a bank holding company and its subsidiar-
ies, following several years' association with a private law firm.
1. The FDIC was created by the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168. The current
statutes governing the operations of the FDIC are codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982).
The adoption of a deposit insurance program in 1933 was outside the mainstream of financial
reform legislation of the time. The insurance legislation was not a part of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion's program and many persons, both within and outside of the Roosevelt Administration, held out
little hope for its success. The record of state attempts to operate deposit insurance systems, a record
extending back more than a century prior to 1933, was not encouraging. See S. KENNEDY, THE
BANKING CRISIS OF 1933 214-23 (1973).
2. There are three deposit insurance agencies: The FDIC insures deposit accounts in commercial
and mutual savings banks; the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation insures accounts in
savings and loan associations; and the National Credit Union Administration insures accounts in
credit unions.
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Institutions Act of 1982' (Garn-St. Germain Act), when it directed the
deposit insurance agencies to address insurance issues likely to be of sig-
nificance in the new financial environment.
To provide perspective on these issues, the first two sections of this Ar-
ticle briefly discuss the history and current status of federal financial ser-
vices regulation in general, and of deposit insurance in particular. The
third section then explains why current efforts to deregulate substantially
the financial services industry will create intolerable strains on the ex-
isting deposit insurance system. Ameliorating these strains will require a
fundamental restructuring of the deposit insurance system: The traditional
relationships among the deposit insurance agencies, depository institu-
tions, and the deposit-holding public must be altered to account for the
changes introduced by deregulation. The final section discusses the neces-
sary alteration of these relationships.
I. Federal Regulation of Financial Services
A group of federal statutes adopted in the early and mid-
1930s-including the Banking Act of 1933," The Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933,' the Securities Act of 1933,8 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 7-established a neatly compartmentalized and tightly regulated
financial structure. The statutes carefully differentiated and in some in-
stances made highly specialized the powers of financial institutions, so
that, for example, only investment banking houses could underwrite cor-
porate securities and only commercial banks could offer demand deposit
services. In general, Congress contemplated a system of specialized
financial institutions, with some necessary overlap.
Depository institutions were subjected to a number of new regulations.
For example, the cost of deposits was regulated for the first time at the
federal level, with a zero interest ceiling on demand deposits, and admin-
istratively determined ceilings on savings and time deposits.8 In addition,
entry into the business of accepting deposits became more tightly regulated
3. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 712, 96 Stat.
1496, 1544.
4. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (current version codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1982)).
5. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
1461-1470 (1982)).
6. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1982)).
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78a-78kk (1982)).
8. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 1I b, 48 Stat. 162, 181-82 (current version codified at 12 U.S.C.§§ 371a, 371b (1982)). These regulations are currently being phased out. See infra note 14.
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because of the deposit insurance programs.' In connection with its provi-
sions allowing national banks to establish branches for the first time, the
1927 McFadden Act precluded interstate bank branching, with intrastate
bank branching continuing to be governed by state law.'0 New legislation
in 1956 prohibited interstate bank expansion by multi-bank holding
companies."
These statutes either created or maintained separate regulatory systems
and agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation," and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. Coordination among these agencies, each of which had regulatory
jurisdiction over a different field of financial services, was not a matter of
primary concern. The various groups of financial institutions were suffi-
ciently insulated by reason of their carefully drawn spheres of activity to
make unnecessary any special provision for coordination among the vari-
ous regulatory agencies.
The rationale for establishing this kind of system was clear: to prevent
a recurrence of the type of catastrophic financial collapse that had oc-
curred between 1930 and 1933. Underlying much of the new legislation
was a pervasive belief-which extended to nonfinancial fields-that exces-
sive competition was a primary cause of the economic collapse. The new
system was intended, among other things, to restrain competition, not only
among financial industry groups but also within the banking industry
itself."
As happens with any set of regulations superimposed on an essentially
competitive business, some erosion occurred over the years in the various
lines of demarcation and in other constraints. The system, however, re-
mained essentially unchanged until the late 1970s, when it began to dis-
integrate rapidly. This disintegration primarily resulted from the commu-
nications-computer revolution, an extended period of high inflation and
high interest rates, a new attitude among government regulators toward
9. For.example, the Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 702, required any state
nonmember insured bank to obtain the written consent of the FDIC prior to establishing any new
branch. The factors to be considered in granting such approval included "[tihe financial history and
condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general
character of its management, the convenience and needs of the community to be served by the bank,
and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this section." Id. at § 101,
49 Stat. at 688.
10. McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (current version codified at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1982)).
11. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (current version
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)).
12. See supra note 1.
13. See generally Huertas, The Regulation of Financial Institutions: A Historical Perspective on
Current Issues, in FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 6,
20-22 (G. Benston ed. 1983) (discussing ways in which regulation limits competition among banks).
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competition among financial institutions (now viewed as a desirable objec-
tive rather than something to be prevented), and the entrepreneurial im-
agination of some financial managers, particularly as the financial de-
mands from the public became larger and more complex.
The recent changes in the industry are well known. Regulations limit-
ing interest rates paid on deposits have largely disappeared;"' the powers
of thrift institutions were expanded when it became apparent that special-
ization in long-term, fixed-rate lending to purchasers of residential
properties could not be sustained in a period of high and volatile market
interest rates;1 and new financial technology is utilized to do business
over broader geographic areas than were contemplated in the legislation of
a half century ago. We are rapidly reaching a situation in which virtually
any financial service may be offered by any financial institution on a na-
tionwide basis. Deregulation-the more usual term for the dismantling of
the system constructed in the early 1930s-is in full swing.
These structural changes in the financial sector of the economy create
the need to reevaluate the role of deposit insurance in our financial sys-
tem. Such a reevaluation, however, should not underestimate the signifi-
cance of deposit insurance to our financial system. This significance is
perhaps best illustrated by the agreement between two of the nation's
leading economists-persons whose views are usually thought of as being
at opposite ends of the economists' spectrum-on the importance of the
deposit insurance sections of the Banking Act of 1933. Professor Milton
Friedman has observed: "Federal insurance of bank deposits was the most
important structural change in the banking system to result from the 1933
panic and, indeed in our view, the structural change most conducive to
monetary stability since state bank note issues were taxed out of existence
immediately after the Civil War."1 Professor John K. Galbraith has de-
scribed the creation of the FDIC in the following terms: "The anarchy of
uncontrolled banking [was] brought to an end not by the Federal Reserve
System, but by the obscure, unprestigious, unwanted Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation. . . . In all American monetary history no legislative
action brought such a change as this."1 7
Deposit insurance, which was quickly extended to savings and loan as-
sociations and later to credit unions, has not only been a positive force for
14. Limitations on interest rates payable on deposits are being phased out pursuant to §§ 201-210
of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,
94 Stat. 132, 142-45 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-09 (1982)).
15. Id. at §§ 401-09, 94 Stat. at 151-60 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
16. M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960
434 (1963).
17. J. GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT 197 (1975).
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monetary stability, but it has also given the federal government a direct
financial stake, of a type and magnitude not found with respect to any
other industry, in the future course of deregulation. For this reason, Con-
gress, in the Garn-St. Germain Act, directed the three federal agencies
insuring deposits or share accounts to address the following questions:18
- the current system of deposit insurance and its impact on the structure
and operations of depository institutions;
- the feasibility of providing depositors the option to purchase additional
deposit insurance covering deposits in excess of the general limit provided
by law and the capability of the private insurance system to provide risk
coverage in excess of the general statutory limit, either directly or through
reinsurance;
- the feasibility of basing deposit insurance premiums on the risk posed
by either the particular insured institution or the category or size of the
depository institution, rather than the present flat-rate system;
- the feasibility of revising the deposit insurance system to provide
greater protection for small depositors while creating greater incentives for
large depositors to monitor their bank's activities; and
- the adequacy of existing public disclosure regarding the condition and
business practices of insured depository institutions, and providing an as-
sessment of changes which may be needed to assure adequate disclosure.
Each of these items touches on an important aspect of the insurance
program. The discussion that follows places these questions in the broader
context of deposit insurance reform and summarizes the FDIC's views
and recommendations. Despite the specificity of these questions, it seems
evident that Congress really was raising the fundamental question of
18. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 712, 96 Stat.
1469, 1544-45.
In addition to these listed issues, Section 712 of the Garn-St. Germain Act directed the insurance
agencies to analyze the impact of expanding insurance coverage on the adequacy of the insurance
funds and the feasibility of consolidating the three separate insurance funds. Because the rate of bank
failure is directly related to general macroeconomic conditions, the adequacy of the deposit insurance
funds cannot be judged according to standard actuarial principles. Nevertheless, the record of the past
50 years suggests that the income flow and size of the FDIC's deposit insurance fund are adequate
today and should be adequate in the future, assuming that the institutions whose liabilities are insured
will receive the proper degree of supervision from the market and/or from the government. The
FDIC also believes that merging the FDIC and the FSLIC into a single agency would be both
feasible and efficient because the functions of thrift institutions and commercial banks are now so
similar that virtually the only legal distinction between them is the nature of the insurance attached to
the liabilities of each. See supra text accompanying note 15. The Bush Task Group on Regulation of
Financial Services, however, has recommended that the separate regulatory and insurance structure
for thrifts be maintained and that the definition of "thrift" be tightened. Institutions that do not meet
a portfolio test - based on a relatively high percentage of residential loans - would not be eligible
for regulation as thrifts and would instead be regulated as banks and insured by the FDIC. Although
the two deposit insurance funds would be continued under the Bush Task Group's proposal, the
FDIC and FSLIC would adopt common capital and accounting standards for banks and savings and
loans.
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whether the existing deposit insurance program should be altered to ac-
commodate or help shape the sweeping changes that are taking place in
the nation's financial system.
II. The Current Status and Objectives of Deposit Insurance
Any inquiry into the role of deposit insurance in a deregulated environ-
ment must begin with the objectives of the insurance program. It is then
necessary to examine how these objectives are implemented in actual prac-
tice. This inquiry is essential to determining whether, or to what extent,
significant reform is necessary, and whether any recommended changes
will serve the public interest.
A. Deposit Insurance Objectives
The subject of deposit insurance was debated in the U.S. Congress for
at least 50 years prior to its adoption in 1933, and fourteen states had
initiated deposit insurance systems at various times between 1829 and
1917, several of which continued until the 1930s.1 From this record, two
public policy objectives consistently emerged: First, deposit insurance
should protect depositors of modest means from the consequences of bank
failure and, second, such insurance should protect communities, states,
and the nation against the economic consequences of wide-spread bank
failure.
The first of these objectives requires little elaboration. Because most
individuals require a bank in which to deposit savings or for paying small
checks, there are many people who must rely on the banking system and
yet who have little ability to protect themselves against the risk of a bank's
closing. There has probably never been a better or more elegant statement
of this particular objective than by a committee of the New York legisla-
ture in 1829, when that state was about to adopt the nation's first deposit
insurance system:
The loss by the insolvency of banks falls generally upon the farmer,
the mechanic, and the laborer, who are least acquainted with the
condition of banks and who, of all others, are most illy able to either
guard against or to sustain a loss by their banks' failure.20
The second objective of deposit insurance relates to its role in promoting
financial stability."1 The modern version of this objective emphasizes that
19. See FDIC, DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT app. G (1983).
20. New York Assembly Journal 439 (1829).
21. In much of the academic literature, the financial stability role of deposit insurance is identified
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demand deposits, the principal liability of most banks, comprise a major
portion of the nation's total money supply. In a fractional reserve banking
system, a stampede by depositors seeking to convert deposits into cash
would produce a severe contraction of the nation's money supply, with
devastating macroeconomic consequences. Deposit insurance can prevent
such panics by guaranteeing payment to depositors if their bank fails.
The backers of deposit insurance legislation in 1933 also saw other,
more immediate and practical benefits."2 One was the belief that govern-
ment intervention, through a'ideposit insurance program, might help re-
store public confidence in a banking system that had virtually collapsed.
Today, the maintenance of public confidence in banking is simply an al-
ternative formulation of the FDIC role in promoting financial stability.
At the time, many also believed that only a deposit insurance program
would enable smaller independent banks to survive and compete success-
fully with larger banking institutions. Thus, the nation's smaller banks,
particularly those in areas especially hard hit by bank failures, were
among the most vigorous supporters of the deposit insurance legislation."
The FDIC has managed to satisfy the cluster of aspirations and objec-
tives of those who sought the adoption of deposit insurance legislation.
First, confidence in the banking system did, in fact, reappear, even though
initial insurance coverage was only $2,500 per depositor. (This limit was
quickly raised to $5,000, where it remained until 1950.) Such confidence
has not been misplaced. Between 1933 and 1982, the FDIC made dis-
bursements in 620 insured bank failures to protect over six million deposi-
tors, resulting in recovery by depositors of $19.7 billion, or 98.9% of in-
sured and uninsured deposits in failing banks. Second, although periods of
monetary or financial instability have occurred during the past fifty years,
such circumstances have not been caused or exacerbated by monetary
"panics" or by the waves of bank failures that had plagued the American
economy prior to 1933.24 Indeed, the total number of insured bank fail-
ures since 1933 has not been much greater than the average number of
bank failures in any single year during the prosperous 1920s, and far
below the rate of bank failures from 1930 to 1933, when some 9,000 com-
mercial banks closed their doors.25
Finally, to the extent that preservation of the existing structure of the
as the only significant or proper objective assigned to the deposit insurance program. See, e.g., Scott &
Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23
STAN. L. REV. 857, 858-59 (1971).
22. For a general discussion of the political turmoil surrounding the creation of federal deposit
insurance in 1933, see S. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 214-23.
23. Id. at 222.
24. See generally M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 16.
25. See FDIC, FDIC SYMBOL OF CONFIDENCE 2 (1983).
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banking industry was an objective of deposit insurance, that goal has been
largely attained. Although numerous factors other than deposit insurance
played a part in shaping the present banking structure, the banking struc-
ture in 1984-whether viewed in terms of the number of banking institu-
tions or their distribution by size (size in "real" terms, of course)-does
not differ significantly from that which was in place on January 1, 1934,
when federal deposit insurance became effective.
B. The Development of FDIC Operating Procedures for Problem Banks
When the record of the past half century is viewed in terms of policy
actions taken by the FDIC or by the Congress, it is evident that the
financial stability objective of deposit insurance is of special importance.
Initially, the Congress only provided the FDIC with authority to arrange
for the payment of depositors, up to the insured maximum, after a bank
was closed and placed in liquidation. In 1935, however, a seemingly insig-
nificant amendment to the Banking Act of 1933 gave the FDIC the au-
thority to facilitate mergers among insured banks whenever the FDIC
found that a merger would eliminate a weak institution." The Congress
believed that such power would enable the FDIC to avoid larger disburse-
ments at some future time, when many such banks could be expected to
fail. By the late 1940s, the FDIC had transformed the assistance of bank
mergers into an alternative method of handling failing banks; by the mid-
dle 1960s, the merger-assistance program was thoroughly integrated into
FDIC procedures for protecting depositors, complete with cost tests, the
use of receiverships in arranging assisted mergers, and the introduction of
"premiums" and bidding procedures. What emerged is known today as
the purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction.
During the past 30 years, the majority of bank failures, and practically
all large bank failures, have been handled through P&A transactions. In
this kind of transaction, the FDIC replaces the bank's bad assets with
cash, and all deposits and other liabilities (other than subordinated debt)
of the failed bank are assumed by another (existing or new) bank. As a
result, no.general creditor incurs any loss, despite the closing of a bank.
On a few occasions the FDIC has provided direct assistance to banks that
were open but would otherwise have failed. Recently, it has also provided
direct assistance to facilitate open bank mergers of failing savings banks.27
26. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 684 (power to facilitate mergers contained
in new section 1213(n)(4) of the Federal Reserve Act) (current version codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)
(1982)).
27. In this type of transaction, the FDIC provides additional capital directly to a failing bank,
which is then merged into another bank without ever being closed. Two recent examples of FDIC
direct assistance to facilitate open bank mergers of failing savings banks are the acquisition of Oregon
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In these transactions, as in P&A transactions, all depositors are made
whole.
The FDIC frequently uses the P&A transaction when handling a dis-
tressed bank for several reasons. In most instances, a P&A transaction
costs the FDIC less than paying insured depositors the amount of their
insured deposits. This savings results because the acquiring institution is
usually willing to pay an attractive premium to acquire a failing bank,
once its bad assets have been purchased by the FDIC. In addition, the
P&A transaction is almost always less disruptive for individual depositors,
bank loan customers, local merchants, and the general community. Fur-
thermore, if the distressed institution is large, the FDIC is almost forced
to arrange a P&A transaction to prevent disruptive consequences to
financial markets. The failure of a large banking institution might bring
down other commercial banks and adversely affect public confidence to
such an extent as to initiate the kind of banking crisis that deposit insur-
ance was intended to prevent. The P&A transaction thus enables the
FDIC to implement its monetary stability objective in a way that might
be impossible if the FDIC only had the option of directly paying insured
depositors.
The development and increasing use of the P&A transaction as one of
the two principal ways of protecting depositors of failing banks were ac-
complished largely by FDIC administrative action. The Congress, how-
ever, has recently implied that it supports this method of dealing with
problem banks. The Garn-St. Germain Act relaxed the conditions under
which the FDIC can provide assistance to distressed insured banks. Under
earlier law, such assistance hinged upon a finding that the continued oper-
ation of the institution was essential to its community. The Garn-St.
Germain Act changed the criterion to a finding that "severe financial con-
ditions exist which threaten the stability of a significant number of in-
sured banks or of insured banks possessing significant financial re-
sources . Thus, any future assessment of the objectives of deposit
insurance policy, as well as the methods of implementing that policy, must
place heavy emphasis on the maintenance of financial stability. Indeed,
that objective already is, or may soon be, "first among equals." This ob-
jective of maintaining financial stability, however, will pose tough ques-
tions for planning the role that deposit insurance should play in a deregu-
lated financial system.
Mutual Savings Bank by Moore Financial Group, Inc. and the acquisition of Auburn Savings Bank
by Syracuse Savings Bank. See FDIC News Releases PR-64-83 (Aug. 5, 1983) and PR-74-83 (Sept.
30, 1983).
28. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 123, 96 Stat.
1469, 1483 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a)).
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11I. Deposit Insurance in a Deregulated Environment: The Problem
Deregulation of financial institutions is, in itself, an important policy
objective. Prior Administrations have made this clear,29 but none more so
than the present Administration. This objective can be stated briefly as
follows: Consistent with the need to maintain a sound financial system,
the constraints on commercial banks and on other financial institutions
that prevent the public from obtaining the benefits of competition among
all financial institutions must be removed.
Against this background, what is the problem posed for, and by, deposit
insurance? Banks, after all, have funded themselves for many years with
deposits that are federally insured; does it make a difference if these funds
must soon be purchased at market rates rather than at regulated rates, or
over a broader geographic area, or if they may now be employed in a
variety of new financial services?
To a certain extent, even before the pace of deregulation accelerated
dramatically, the fact that privately owned and competitive financial insti-
tutions were funded in substantial part by liabilities insured by an agency
of the federal government posed problems. This was the reason for the
adoption of an extensive system of federal supervision and regulation of
banks.80 Yet a significant contraction in the scope of regulation has com-
menced which has not been matched by a contraction in the government's
deposit insurance obligation. Although the logical relationship would ap-
pear to be a concurrent reduction both in regulation and in the govern-
ment's exposure under the deposit insurance program, most signs now
point to further expansion of the government's insurance obligation. This
expansion is due, in large part, to the use of the P&A transaction.
Until the 1970s, the FDIC's use of the P&A transaction could be seen
as nothing more than a commendable financial innovation, enabling the
FDIC to protect the depositors of failing banks in a manner that was least
29. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 107-115
(1981).
30. Normally, as any corporation invests in riskier assets, it will have to pay more for its bor-
rowed funds; lenders will demand a higher rate of return to compensate them for bearing the risk
associated with the corporation's investment plan. In this way, the capital market acts as a rather
strict discipliner of overly zealous managers. This market discipline, however, will obviously not be
effective when most of a corporation's liabilities are insured by the federal government. Since the risk
faced by such lenders will not increase as the firm invests in marginally riskier assets, the lenders have
no reason to demand a higher rate of return and no incentive to monitor management's activities.
Moreover, when insurance premiums are fixed, as deposit insurance premiums currently are, and
when the potential loss is already greater than shareholders' equity, the marginal expected costs of
additional risk will be borne entirely by the insurer, whereas all of the marginal expected benefit
accrues to the firm's shareholders. Obviously, then, some mechanism is required to prevent insured
banks from taking excessive risks. Since the federal government bears the potential costs of excessive
risks, it is not surprising that it would be the one to step forward to regulate the risk incurred by the
banking industry.
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disruptive to the affected communities, most calculated to preserve
financial stability, and, in many cases, most cost efficient. Having devel-
oped the P&A transaction, however, the FDIC is now virtually compelled
to use it in any case involving a large distressed bank. During the 1970s,
there were a sizable number of large distressed insured banks (more than
a few in the multi-billion dollar category) and, with one exception, all
large cases have been handled through either a P&A transaction or direct
assistance.81 It is not possible to say precisely when attitudes in the busi-
ness and financial community began to change, but there seems little
question that sophisticated users of banking services are increasingly
aware that the FDIC's options are limited and that, in most cases, all
deposits will be treated as if they are fully insured regardless of their size.
The scope of the government's insurance obligation has also expanded
in other ways. Insurance coverage, which was raised to $10,000 in 1950,
is now set by statute at $100,000 per depositor-a ten-fold increase. If the
coverage increase had been linked to the rate of inflation (measured by the
Consumer Price Index), insurance coverage today would be only about
$40,000 per depositor. Moreover, it is not unusual to hear suggestions
that the scope of deposit insurance be increased further, but rarely or ever
are there suggestions that it be reduced.
In the Garn-St. Germain Act, the Congress further broadened the in-
surance responsibility of the deposit insurance agencies by adding assis-
tance programs for failing depository institutions to their functions. 32 Al-
though such programs may be sound public policy, they indicate again
that the breadth of the federal government's insurance commitment is still
growing at a time when regulation, which buttresses that commitment, is
diminishing.
Because of this trend, deposit insurance may come to exert a perverse
effect-furthering rather than containing financial instability. This may
happen if the combination of government underwriting of deposit risk and
the natural tendency of depository institutions to take advantage of this
implicit federal subsidy is not checked by off-setting constraints imposed
by government, or by the market, or by both." Indeed, an increasingly
fragile financial structure might be unable to resist even minor shocks. A
significant side effect of a more unstable financial system would be a sub-
31. The one exception is the Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Penn Square
Bank had $517 million in assets and $470 million in deposits when it was closed by the Comptroller
of the Currency on July 5, 1982. The FDIC paid insured depositors up to the insurance limit of
$100,000 and estimates that its liquidation of the bank will produce a 65 percent recovery for deposi-
tors' balances in excess of $100,000.
32. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 111, 122, 96
Stat. 1469, 1469, 1480 (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1823(c), 1729(o).
33. See supra note 30.
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stantial increase in the cost of deposit insurance. Alternatively, the preven-
tion of such fragility could require the slowing down or end of deregula-
tion. Put somewhat differently, comprehensive government insurance of
bank liabilities is inconsistent with deregulation of the institutions respon-
sible for those liabilities. Therefore, the federal government cannot allow
deregulation to proceed much further without addressing the issues posed
by deposit insurance. Yet, checking the deregulation movement would
mean thwarting an important public policy objective-the attainment of
more effective competition among financial institutions.
IV. Adapting Deposit Insurance to a Deregulated Environment: Some
Possible Solutions
The FDIC believes that meaningful deregulation requires significant
simultaneous reform of the ways in which the deposit insurance programs
now operate. This section discusses possible reforms of the internal poli-
cies and procedures of the FDIC and, in the course of the discussion,
addresses the specific questions posed by the Congress in the Garn-St.
Germain Act.
The reform recommendations of the FDIC can be analyzed in various
ways. Our approach is to consider first those recommendations that call
for action by the government (primarily by the FDIC) and, second, those
recommendations that look to the private sector for assistance. Before
looking at these recommendations, however, a brief comment on the view
that banking deregulation may be accomplished without significant
changes in the deposit insurance system may be useful.
A. Deregulation and the Need for Deposit Insurance Reform
Some have suggested that banking organizations can be deregulated
without altering the current deposit insurance system, at least insofar as
product and geographic deregulation are concerned. This could occur by
requiring that new, nontraditional banking activities be conducted not by
the bank itself, but by affiliated corporations within a holding company
structure. Transactions between the bank and its affiliates would be pro-
hibited or strictly regulated. Deposit insurance would relate only to the
bank, which would, in effect, be insulated from the other affiliates in the
holding company.
This type of proposal has recently been suggested to the Congress by
the Treasury Department. 4 Although no precise tabulation has been
made, the weight of opinion seems to be that it is impractical to think that
34. The Treasury Department's proposals comprise S. 1609, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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the future of the bank can be separated from the future of the company of
which it is a part. The public will inevitably view the bank and its hold-
ing company as one institution. The FDIC shares this view.
On the other hand, some commentators contend that real separation of
a bank's activities from those of its affilitates has never been actively at-
tempted or pursued by regulatory authorities and that the proposed sepa-
ration is workable, both legally and practically. Regardless of the respec-
tive merits of the arguments, this type of reform lies beyond the scope of
this Article. It is nonetheless a reform that is certain to be before the
Congress and should therefore not be disregarded.
B. FDIC Initiatives
Basing deposit insurance premiums on the riskiness of a bank's opera-
tions has long been a serious reform proposal. 5 Proponents of risk-related
deposit insurance premiums argue that a constant insurance assessment
rate (currently equal to 1/12 of one percent of assessable deposits, less a
net assessment credit based on FDIC expenses and losses)" fails to penal-
ize banks that pose a high risk to the deposit insurance fund. Moreover,
fixed insurance premiums may encourage excessive risk-taking by banks
because the insurer bears all the marginal expected costs of additional risk
but all marginal expected benefits accrue to the bank's shareholders.3 For
this reason, insured banks must be extensively supervised. Proponents of a
risk-related premium argue that most restrictions on bank activities, and
much bank supervision, could be eliminated if each bank's insurance as-
sessment reflected the risk that the bank's operations pose to the insurance
fund.
Although the use of risk-related premiums is theoretically appealing,
the FDIC has concluded that establishment of an "ideal" risk-related pre-
mium system is not feasible. Under an "ideal" system, the insurance fund
would be fully compensated for all risk-taking. Such a system would,
however, entail unrealistic data requirements and require risk quantifica-
tion techniques not currently available. Even if these problems could be
overcome, the resulting FDIC authority over banks-much of it necessar-
ily judgmental in nature-would be far greater than any governmental
35. See, e.g., Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal De-
posit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1971).
36. Section 7(d) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(d) (1982), provides for a
refund to insured banks for a part of the excess of insurance assessments (i.e., premiums) collected
during the year by the FDIC over related operating and insurance expenses. In accordance with this
provision, the FDIC makes refunds by way of crediting the individual banks for the amounts other-
wise due for insurance assessments in the following year-hence the expression "assessment credit."
37. See supra note 30.
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agency should have in an economic society based on free enterprise
principles.
In the FDIC's view, however, simple fairness dictates that moderate
differentials in deposit insurance rates should be implemented to reward
sound bank management and to penalize banks that refuse to conform to
elementary standards of acceptable bank behavior. Accordingly, the FDIC
proposes a risk-related premium program that relates premiums to rea-
sonably sound measures of risk, with a maximum premium differential
equal to the assessment credit. In addition, the FDIC will seek authority
to charge banks for any disproportionate amount of supervisory time re-
quired to correct problem bank situations.
The limited program envisioned by the FDIC may, over time, evolve
into a program that more closely meets the objectives of an "ideal" system.
At this stage, however, attempting to institute a full-blown, risk-related
assessment program is impractical and possibly harmful .3
C. Private Sector Initiatives
The FDIC has concluded that the best solutions to the problems set
forth above entail mobilizing the resources of the private market. Several
possibilities are quite promising.
Disclosure - One very useful type of reform would simply be an ex-
tension of existing practice. Specifically, the FDIC believes that improving
the required public disclosure of bank information could enhance the mar-
ket's ability to control the behavior of banks.39 The effectiveness of such
disclosures, however, depends in part on the interest in, or usefulness of,
the information provided-the interest and usefulness of information be-
ing a function of the extent to which additional risk is shifted from the
FDIC to the private sector. Nevertheless, even if the allocation of risk
between the FDIC and the private sector did not change, existing private
sector surveillance of banks should intensify with improved disclosure.
The FDIC has developed a policy statement setting forth minimum
standards for bank disclosure. This policy encourages uninsured deposi-
tors to request necessary additional information from banks that do not
38. Although risk-related premiums are conceptually appealing, particularly in an environment of
deregulation, there are costs and tradeoffs to consider. For example, the supervisory costs necessary to
apply risk measurements could be very substantial depending on the comprehensiveness and precision
desired, and in addition to increased supervisory costs, a risk-based system could entail an expensive
appeals program.
39. For a general discussion of the role of market forces in controlling corporate behavior, see R.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978). This approach to the theory of corporate
governance has received much attention in the context of tender offers. See, e.g., Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV.
819 (1981).
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adequately comply with the disclosure standards.
In addition, Bank Call Reports40 are presently being revised to make
them more comprehensive for purposes of risk analysis. Additions to these
documents will provide regulators and the public with data on credit risk
(loan quality) and interest rate risk, areas not previously covered in these
reports.4 Finally, the FDIC is also considering adopting a policy under
which it would publicize its statutory enforcement actions against banks.
Under the proposed policy, the FDIC would publish its final orders near
the time of their effective dates in the Federal Register.
Reducing effective insurance coverage - Since insured depository insti-
tutions have an incentive to assume more risk than the market would per-
mit in the absence of insurance, banks have been subject to a set of statu-
tory and regulatory constraints on their activities.'2  Wholesale
deregulation of insured depository institutions, with no change in the ex-
isting insurance system, could therefore pose financial stability problems
for the FDIC and the economy. A common sense approach to this prob-
lem would be to reduce the de facto level of insurance coverage so that
some important portion of deposit liabilities is placed at risk. The reduc-
tion in insurance coverage should result in better private-sector policing of
bank risk-taking activities. Moreover, this type of reform would satisfy the
mandate of the Garn-St. Germain Act because the feasibility of obtaining
more effective discipline of banks from bank depositors, particularly those
with larger balances, is precisely one of the matters that the Congress
directed the deposit insurance agencies to examine.'
How might such a reduction in de facto insurance coverage be ob-
tained? The FDIC could accomplish such a reduction by abandoning the
use of the P&A transaction and direct assistance procedures and hence-
forth following a policy of paying depositors in failed insured banks only
the amounts of their deposits up to the statutory ceiling of $100,000. Such
a policy would unquestionably attract attention from large depositors, and
also is consistent with the public policy objective of protecting unsophisti-
cated depositors with modest balances.
There are, however, several problems with this approach. First, it
would expose communities in which bank failures occur to needless dis-
tress. As discussed earlier, the P&A transaction provides a means by
which the FDIC can handle bank failures, while avoiding the disruptive
40. Call Reports are filed by all insured banks at the end of each calendar quarter and consist of a
balance sheet, income statement, and other schedules.
41. This revision raises issues of competitive equity because savings and loan associations are not
required to disclose data on loan quality.
42. See supra note 30.
43. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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consequences of such closings. More importantly, reducing the protection
of uninsured depositors would seriously impair the FDIC's ability to
achieve its second public policy objective: protecting the public from the
destabilizing effects of bank failure. Although no one can be certain as to
how much of a destabilizing effect such a change would have, if the FDIC
were to place all uninsured depositors at substantial risk, many competent
observers believe that the failure (or even reports of serious difficulties) of
large banks might set off a chain of problems, threatening otherwise
sound institutions. In short, such a program would increase the
probability of bank runs and therefore have the destabilizing effect that
the FDIC was established to prevent.
Various reform possibilities exist, however, between the two extremes
of providing a de facto 100 percent insurance coverage for all depositors
and paying off depositors only up to the insurance maximum. The policy
most attractive to the FDIC combines the continued use of the P&A
transaction in most instances with the introduction of some risk-bearing
by depositors with sizable balances. Specifically, the FDIC is considering
a procedure through which it would make an immediate appraisal of the
assets of a failed bank and estimate the ultimate total recovery on those
assets. The FDIC would use this estimate to determine the extent to
which depositors in the failed bank are protected. To illustrate, assume
that the FDIC estimates that recovery on the assets of a particular failed
bank would equal eighty percent of all claims of the depositors (or of the
FDIC on behalf of depositors it has paid) and general creditors. The
FDIC could then structure a transaction, similar to the current P&A
transaction, but in which only insured deposits and, in this case, eighty
percent of uninsured deposits and other liabilities would pass to the ac-
quiring bank, along with an equal volume of failed bank assets and cash
(less any premium that the acquiring bank might be willing to pay). A
variant on this approach could provide, by statute, that only a fixed per-
centage (such as seventy-five percent) of deposit balances over $100,000
could be recovered, irrespective of the ultimate recovery on assets.
A transaction modified in either of these ways would retain many of the
advantages of the present P&A transaction. Most of the goodwill and de-
posit relationships of the former bank would be preserved. Although unin-
sured depositors would lose a portion of their funds, they would retain
immediate access to most of their deposits. If the initial recovery were
based on an estimate of the actual recovery, additional amounts would be
paid to depositors if the actual recovery exceeded the estimated recovery.
Returning to the example above, if the actual recovery exceeded eighty
percent, the additional amount recovered would be distributed to the de-
positors. Should the FDIC's ultimate recovery fall short of its initial esti-
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mate, then presumably the FDIC's share of the loss would exceed that of
the uninsured general creditors. (In a regular P&A transaction, it should
be remembered, the FDIC bears all of the loss.)
A modified P&A transaction, although still providing uninsured deposi-
tors with a substantial portion of their deposits, would nevertheless expose
them and other general creditors to some risk of loss. This exposure to
loss would create incentives for depositors to avoid risky banks and to be
more vigilant in monitoring the activities of the banks they select. The
modified P&A trahsaction also could be used for very large banks because
the proposed program allows even the largest uninsured depositors imme-
diate access to a substantial portion of their deposits.
Even this modified approach could create some financial instability.
Some observers with whom the FDIC has consulted have warned that any
exposure to risk by large depositors may have destabilizing effects. Such
exposure, for example, could cause the problem of bank runs to recur. In
the FDIC's view, however, the suggested program is sufficiently modest
that it is unlikely to have such adverse consequences. Moreover, if large
depositors are already aware of their existing level of risk and monitor it
closely, as many of these same critics assert, then a marginal increase in
risk exposure should not have the kinds of dramatic consequences
suggested.
Non-government deposit insurance - Another alternative is private de-
posit insurance. The private insurance industry might be capable and de-
sirous of shouldering a larger portion of the deposit insurance burden,
now borne almost entirely by the federal government. Moreover, if the
FDIC is successful in modifying its P&A transaction procedures along the
lines described above, large depositors may eagerly seek supplemental in-
surance. For this reason, Congress, in the Garn-St. Germain Act, re-
quested an analysis of the feasibility of offering excess coverage at the
purchaser's option and the capacity of the private insurance industry to
provide such excess coverage."'
It would be redundant for the FDIC to offer such excess coverage
(since the FDIC, for all practical purposes, now insures virtually all de-
posits) unless such an offer were part of a program to replace the P&A
transaction and other procedures with the former policy of providing in-
surance protection solely through deposit payoffs up to the insurance
maximum. The major problem with the FDIC providing such additional
coverage is the difficulty of pricing additional risk. Such a plan would be
impractical for the same reason that risk-related premiums are impracti-
cal: With current methods of measuring risk, one could never be certain
44. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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that the government agency was pricing risk accurately and fairly. If the
FDIC felt confident that risk could be priced appropriately in this situa-
tion, then, of course, it would be confident that such pricing could be done
for all deposits.
Private insurance companies would face a similar problem of risk pric-
ing. Quite apart from pricing problems, however, private insurance com-
panies would also encounter serious capacity constraints. Therefore, pri-
vate insurance coverage will continue to be fairly narrow in scope,
focusing on individual customers or selected institutions. The FDIC dis-
cussed this subject with representatives from a selected group of compa-
nies and found little reason to believe that the private sector can make
comprehensive insurance programs available.
The FDIC's conclusion on the infeasibility of private insurance cover-
age may be premature. If the FDIC modifies its P&A procedure, the de-
mand for excess insurance coverage might stimulate the development of
private industry initiatives, a possibility that should not be dismissed. To
the extent that the private sector is capable of offering additional insur-
ance coverage, new market forces will be exerted on banks to reduce risk,
a development welcomed by the FDIC.45 The FDIC believes, however,
the development of private-sector deposit insurance should be left to the
free play of the market, without subsidization from the FDIC.
Increasing the risk of junior creditors - Enhanced market discipline of
banks may be obtained in ways other than increasing depositor risk. Inter-
mediate and long-term subordinated debt affords certain advantages over
deposits in creating market discipline of banks. Subordinated lenders are
apt to be more sophisticated at evaluating credit risk. Having made a loan
or investment, they generally cannot rapidly liquidate their investment
without incurring some loss when a bank becomes financially troubled.
For this reason, ,they view the borrower's (bank's) operations from a long-
term perspective. Unlike stockholders, their return is fixed, and they gen-
erally receive no benefit from increased risk. Unlike depositors, they can-
not count on being bailed out when a bank fails. If a bank does fail, the
investment of subordinated creditors in the bank provides a protective
cushion to the FDIC. Thus, subordinated creditors generally have both
the ability and incentives to monitor carefully a bank's risk-taking
behavior.
Fashioning a system in which junior creditors play a larger part in
45. Private sector insurers could be expected to monitor closely a bank's investment activities and
to alter insurance premiums in accordance with the riskiness of a bank's portfolio. This would inter-
nalize the cost of additional risk to the bank and thus avoid the potential problem of excessive risk-
taking by banks. See supra note 30.
Vol. 1: 195, 1984
Deposit Insurance
applying market discipline to banks is not difficult. This could be accom-
plished, for example, by changing capital adequacy standards, which pro-
vide for a required minimum level of capital relative to assets, to include
the further requirement that a specific portion of capital be subordinated
debt. The contract between the bank and its subordinated debt holders
could be expected to constrain the bank's risk-taking activities. This, of
course, would be a significant step. Although the FDIC does not recom-
mend this approach at present, it considers the approach worthy of serious
consideration."
Conclusion
In the final analysis, proposals intended to enable the FDIC to fulfill
its public interest objectives in a changed financial environment must re-
flect a judgment on a probable best course. Although some recommend
that the FDIC await the unfolding of events, the FDIC is convinced that
the risks of maintaining the status quo are unacceptably high. Its core
conclusions and recommendations with respect to restructuring the rela-
tionships among the FDIC, banks, and depositors include the following:
-The success of deposit insurance may be attributed in part to extensive
regulation of banks, including constraints on interest payments, powers,
and expansion opportunities.
-The responsibilities of the deposit insurance system are expanding at a
time when regulation is contracting, setting up a potentially dangerous
situation.
-The institution of new and more extensive supervision and regulation of
banks would choke off the present deregulation movement and its
promise of a more competitive financial system. To attempt to price
deposit insurance so as to compensate adequately for any new risk that
banks may assume is impractical, although the FDIC does recommend
a modest step in that direction.
-Accordingly, the private sector should assume some modest portion of
the risk now borne fully by the federal government. The most attractive
way to accomplish this objective appears to be a modified P&A transac-
tion, combined with better financial disclosure by banks, the enactment
of a depositor preference statute, ' and possibly some control over de-
46. The notion that a specific portion of bank capital be in the form of subordinated debt makes
good sense in theory. The FDIC, however, is not in a position to evaluate the immediate impact that
such a requirement would have on a bank's ability to rearrange its capital structure and the market's
willingness to support such moves. Consequently, the FDIC is not ready to make a concrete proposal.
47. A depositor preference statute would make all other liabilities of the bank, with possible ex-
ceptions for a few immaterial accounts, subordinate to the claims of depositors in the event of
liquidation.
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posit brokerage. 8
Any transfer of risk to the private sector is potentially destabilizing.
This is intended and desirable to a certain extent. Banks unable to handle
the new opportunities presented by deregulation should not be protected
from market discipline. It is uncertain whether the destabilizing conse-
quences will prove to be too great. In the FDIC's judgment, however,
there is great potential for massive, systemic problems if changes along the
lines recommended are not implemented.
Some will also ask how the private-sector can be expected to evaluate
accurately the condition of banks if the FDIC is not capable of instituting
a risk-related premium system. After all, the FDIC is in a better position
to reach judgments on the condition of individual banks due to its superior
access to information, such as bank examination reports, which is not
available to the private sector. Although this position is plausible, the
FDIC believes that improving the flow of information to the private sector
through more extensive disclosure can rectify this situation. The funda-
mental question remains, however, concerning the extent to which such
disclosure is consistent with maintaining a stable financial system.
The FDIC will continue to utilize its supervisory powers to work with
individual banks to solve problem situations. It will also use its enforce-
ment powers when cooperation cannot be obtained. The FDIC can go
further, of course, but substituting the FDIC's judgment for that of bank
managers and the market would inject the FDIC into bank management
to an extensive degree. Such a course of action would reverse the trend of
deregulation and produce a banking system which is essentially govern-
ment directed. The FDIC prefers the judgment of the market which,
though harsh on occasion, has generally served the nation well.
The FDIC is not suggesting that banks and other financial institutions
48. The straight brokering of deposits to insured institutions operates by a money broker, acting
on its own or at the request of an institution or institutions, soliciting deposits from its customers. The
customer may send deposits directly to the bank at the request of the broker or the broker itself may
transfer the customer's funds to the institution, having the deposit registered in its name as nominee or
agent for the customer. Another variation is for the.broker to engage in the practice of selling partici-
pations in large denominations of certificates of deposit. So long as the broker informs the institution
that the deposits are being held by the broker as nominee and the broker maintains records to reflect
the individual ownership interest, FDIC insurance applies to each individual customer to the maxi-
mum of $100,000. The FDIC is concerned that the multiple insurance coverage afforded in relation to
such deposits, which can be accumulated quickly and in large amounts, fails to encourage market and
institution analysis in their placement. The availability of these funds to all institutions, irrespective of
financial and managerial soundness, reduces market discipline. Although deposit brokering can pro-
vide a source of liquidity, it also makes it possible for poorly managed institutions to continue operat-
ing beyond the time at which natural market forces would have otherwise precipitated their failure.
This impediment to natural market forces results in increased cost to the FDIC in the form of either
greater insurance payments or higher assistance expenditures if the institutions are later closed be-
cause of insolvency.
Vol. 1: 195, 1984
Deposit Insurance
be thrown open to the unrestricted consequences of market-driven deci-
sions. It does support a modest move toward co-responsibility or co-insur-
ance between the public and private sectors. The deposit insurance and
supervisory framework can no longer afford merely to react to evolution-
ary change; it must be structured to deal with the dynamics of the
financial services industry in the future. The FDIC believes that its pro-
posed changes in the structure of financial services regulation will enable
deregulation to proceed unchecked, but not at the cost of creating an un-
stable financial system.

